Implications Of Implementation: A Case Study Of Economic Development Agnacy (Eda) In The Us
Implementation is one of the crucial stages of public policy process which has been defined by Hill, Michael and Hupe, Peter (2002: 3) as “to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete.” Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) contend that policy and implementation are so much interrelated that the two stages are very difficult to separate completely; as, “a verb like ‘implement’ must have an object like ‘policy’.” (Hill & Hupe 2002: 4). Apart form the approaches used for the study of implementation, the objective is to implement what is being planned and their outcomes tell us about the results and whether the set goals are achieved or not. On this basis, the success or failure of any policy can be judged.
A case study of Economic Development Agency (EDA) initiated in 1966 with million, Jeffery L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1984) provide a critical account of the study of implementation and the challenges faced by this program and the underlying causes of the failure of this program. EDA was an agency established by the Congress which aimed at providing employment opportunities to minorities in cities. However, Oakland was chosen as experiment in showing how the provision of public works and building loans can provide incentives for employers to hire minorities (Pressman & Wildavsky 1984: xx). The project aimed at creating 3000 jobs for the Oakland’s Black-American minority basically. Although there was a high sense of urgency at the beginning of the project, but sooner, the doubts about the success of the program became evident.
Eugene Foley, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Development, was the early initiator of the program who wished to initiate “a massive experiment in solving the principle urban problem, unemployment” in Oakland (Pressman & Wildavsky 1984: 2). He believed that the huge injection of needed funds ( million) was the most important component for the success of the project (though he resigned in 1966). After examining the “torturous course of the program”, Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) have given the account of frustrations of the program characterized by underlying reasons adding to frustrations and the “difficulties of translating broad agreement into specific decisions, given a wide range of participants and perspectives” (p. 6), blockage and delay, underlying economic theories etc. the authors point towards these “technical details” of the project which had to be worked out closely for the effective implementation of the project.
One of the characteristics of the program’s requirements was the compulsion for employers wishing to receive EDA business loan to draw up an employment plan specifying how these companies would hire the long term unemployed Black residents of Oakland. For this purpose the EDA was required to work in collaboration with other local, state and federal agencies for creating training program. This added to the complexity of joint agreement between broad number of actors who further diverge in mutual consensus, sense of urgency and levels of priority. This accounted for the unanticipated consequences which interfere with effective implementation. Pressman and Wildavsky noted that “when perspectives differ, so also do measure of success” (p. 98). As for instance, the job creation for blacks was the main goal and criteria of success for the original EDA leaders, while the criteria was different for other participants of the program; the expansion of its facilities was the main objective of the Port of Oakland; on the other hand the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was forcing for increased funding for its established skill centre.
There were 30 decision points identified by the authors who stress that there was a time at which one or more participants had to reach agreement before the project proceeded. For this purpose, 70 agreements were needed by various stakeholders. Hence the authors concluded that if the probability of agreement at each clearance point were 0.99, the probability of success of the whole project would be less than 50%. It the probability of agreement was only 0.09 at each clearance point, then the probability of success would drop to barely one percent (p. 108). The authors contend that to minimize the chances of delay and divergence of interests, the “essential policy problem is how to provide incentives to change low to high intensity or more accurately, how to maintain high positive intensity through the lengthy delays” (p. 120).
They also discussed the change of intensity of commitment by pointing the change of officials at different stages, as for instance, Foley was a very passionate about the program who was replaced (due to his resignation) by officials who had far less intensity of commitment to the project. Linking policy formulation with implementation is important for the successful implementation without delays; “although those who design programs might not generally enjoy the less exciting work of directing their implementation, a realization of the extent to which policy depends on implementation could lead such people to alter their own time perspectives and stay around for the technical details of executing a program” (Pressman & Wildavsky 1984: 146). By explaining the reason for delay, they argue that consensus between several decision makers is difficult to achieve due the bargaining between administrators and stakeholders. The problem is not the “no” at any decision point by the decision makers, but the challenge is achieve the “yes” of several actors.
The writers also contend that “the use of resources is a direct function of intensity of preference” (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984: 117). The desired outcome is easy to achieve if the intensity to achieve the outcomes is high and vis-à-vis. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) also spoke about the importance of bureaucracy is to ensure a “high probability that each and every actor will cooperate” (p. 132). Similarity of goals and objectives is very imperative. By coordination, the authors mean that it is about the “ability to enforce agreements on employers when you are unable to do so; compelling federal agencies and their component parts to act in a desired manner at the right time, when achieving this purpose is precisely what you can not do” (Pressman & Wildavsky 1984: 134).
In essence, EDA’s Oakland project, which was basically an urban development agency, has shown that “implementation should not be divorced from policy” (Pressman & Wildavsky 1984: 143). The EDA project was initially seen as not very complex; as all the goals were set and funds committed but the complexity and multiplicity of several actors, agencies, bureaucracy, firms, and other stakeholders had added to the complexity, delay and failure of the project. Hence, the major problem is to make implementation problems as part of initial policy formulation process. “Implementation must not be conceived as a process that takes place after, and independent of, the design of policy” (Pressman and Wildavsky 1974: 143).
Reference:
Pressman, L. Jeffrey & Wildavsky, Aron (1984) “Implementation: How great Expectations Are Dashed in Oakland” (University of California Press: London)
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